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In his The Reasons of Love, drawn from 
lectures originally given in Princeton in 2000 and 
University College London in 2001 , Harry Frankfurt 
hopes to clarify the concepts of 'what is of interest,' 
'what we care about,' and 'what it is we love' (11). In 
the course of this clarification, however, the possibly 
rich content of these issues is lost. His analysis is 
almost impudently unsocial-theoretical. The project is 
to show that the question about how one should live 
is dependent upon what one cares about, and that 
what one cares about is (at least partially) constitutive 
of oneself and one's life as meaningful. Chapter one 
sets up this general project and considers what it is to 
care about something. Chapter two delineates the role 
of love in guiding one's interests and cares. Chapter 
three synthesizes these analyses by° arguing that self-
love is the paradigmatic form of love and best guides 
one into feeling at home with oneself. 
Caring about something is a variation on 
desiring or wanting. I may want ice cream or global 
peace, for example without caring much about it, about 
what variety it takes or when it happens. To care about 
something is to be "willingly committed" to the desire 
for that thing (16) . Caring about is self-referential, 
then, and is structurally related to who and how one 
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is; it "binds us to ourselves 11 (17). What this discussion lacks, unfortunately, is any 
account of caring for something and its relation to caring about that thing. Can I 
genuinely care about global peace if I do not also care for it by, say, refusing to 
be dogmatic or by trying to convince others of a certain variety of it? The concern 
intensifies when one considers the importance of caring about and caring for 
others. 
For Frankfurt, what counts as important arises from what we care about 
(23); international law is only important to me if I care about global justice or the 
like. To give reasons for how I ought to act is to state what is important to me. But, 
to state this I must know what I care about. Frankfurt is right, then, to think that the 
normative question cannot be the most basic; the factual question "What do I care 
about?" must be more basic (26-8). Resolving the "hesitations11 of this question 
requires "self-confidence," something afforded by loving something (28). 
Loving something is a mode of caring about it. Loving is a kind of caring for 
which one has no reasons. Rather, it is reason itself for behaving or living in some 
way. "Love is itself, for the lover, a source of reasons 11 for acting in the beloved's 
interests (37). Thus love just is concomitant with the value 'found' in the beloved, 
and in this sense one falls in love. According to Frankfurt, one distinctive feature of 
love is that one cannot decide through deliberation to be in love. A second feature 
is that a beloved's value is intrinsic and not instrumental. Third, love entails willing 
what is good for the beloved simply because it is good for the beloved and not 
for any concerns of the lover. Lastly, love cannot be an "impersonal" care, but is 
"ineluctably" attached to the particularity of the beloved. 
Here one sees the clearest signs of the text breaching its own limits. 
Frankfurt seeks to treat love as a kind of care about something, which need not 
be a person. The four characteristics could understandably apply to love between 
persons, but make less sense when the beloved is something else. Do I love 
global justice in its specificity and not because it is a kind of justice? Do I love it for 
its intrinsic worth or because it brings about good ends? 
For Frankfurt, self-love is the purest form of love and is the well of 
confidence one needs to accept the constraints on action and desire which are 
imposed by the love of something. Love of oneself is the most strictly disinterested 
and particular to the beloved, the least in one's control to reject with any kind of 
ease, and the identification between lover and beloved is clearest (81ff). Frankfurt 
rightly modifies this to say that one can love oneself even without (knowing one's) 
interests, by caring that one have the sorts of interests that operate as goals or 
as beloveds. Only in the presence of such goals does a life become meaningfully 
oriented (cf. 90). Loving oneself- as caring for the perdurance of one's own 
guiding desires and values- is a kind of wholeheartedness or resoluteness in 
willing which enables one to properly ask the normative question "How should I 
live?" 
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While the trajectory of his thinking is clear, Frankfurt's metaphorical use 
of ·1ove' has ramifications. He cannot shake the intersubjective, social core of the 
issue. He self-critically marks his dependency upon familial love as an example 
(89) . He sees this as a simplification because he wants his analysis of love to have 
broader scope. But why not recognize the repeated irruption of parental love as 
indicative of something essential or paradigmatic of love in general? Why persist in 
trying to show self-love to be the purest kind of love when parental love is doing all 
the heavy lifting? The praising of self-love in this way is surprising more for taking 
an intersubjective emotion-but aren't they all?-as radically individualistic, than 
for transgressing common moral thinking. 
Despite doing harm to the meaning of love in order to give a certain 
moral-psychological account, it is nonetheless promising to see this branch of 
philosophy broaching issues previously ignored: being at home in the world and 
with oneself, self-confidence, emotions generally, pre-normative bases for ethics. 
Perhaps if these are thought through further, thinkers like Frankfurt will begin to 
think from a more social or intersubjective basis. 
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